به نام خدا

هنگاهی که عدم تعادل نسبت جنسیتی (تعداد دختران و پسران) در سنین عمده و اصلی ازدواج به وجود می اید با پدیده ای به نام marriage squeeze  یا تنگنای ازدواج روبرو میشویم جمعیت دختران ایران در برخی گروه های سنی، از جمعیت پسران جوان افزون تر شده است و سازمان ملی جوانان ایران، اعلام کرده که طبق تازه ترین پژوهش های آماری، یك میلیون و 250 هزاردختر 20 تا 29 ساله ایرانی بدون همسر باقی می مانند. ایلنا، خبرگزاری کار ایران، گزارش داده است که بر اساس تحقیقی که به وسیله سازمانملی جوانان انجام شده، تعداد دختران ۲۰ تا ۲۹ ساله حدود ۶ میلیون و ۲۰۰ هزار نفر وتعداد پسران ۲۵ تا ۳۴ ساله حدود ۴ میلیون و ۸۰۰ هزار نفر هستند و همین اختلاف آماریاست که نگرانی هایی در مورد بدون همسر ماندن دختران جوان ایجاد کرده است. در اینتحقیق تعداد دختران در دو گروه سنی ۲۰ تا ۲۴ و ۲۵ تا ۲۹ سال و تعداد پسران دردوگروه سنی ۲۵ تا ۲۹ و ۳۰ تا ۳۴ ساله منظور شده است و با در نظر گرفتن این واقعیتکه پسران به ازدواج با دختران در گروه سنی پایین تر تمایل بیشتری نشان می‌‏دهند،نتیجه گرفته شده که یک میلیون و ۲۵۰ هزار دختر شانس ازدواج نخواهند داشت. اما ازقرار معلوم، احتمال بدون همسر ماندن یک میلیون و 250 هزار دختر جوان تنها نگرانیمسئولان ایرانی نیست زیرا در ادامه این گزارش آمده است که "اگر به ارقام این تحقیق،تعداد دختران بالای ۲۹ سال را که هنوز ازدواج نکرده اند نیز اضافه کنیم شاید بهرقمی بالغ بر ۷ میلیون نفر دست بیابیم." البته به وجود امدن این مساله در ایران دلایل خاصی دارد و پیشنهاداتی نیز در جهت کاهش اثرات این مساله مطرح گردیده است.

به نام خدا

این اصطلاح به معنی تنگناهای ازذواج هست كه كشور ما حتما با ان مواجه هست.

یكی از تنگناهای جمعیتی این موضوع ساختار فعلی جمعیت ایران هست كه در ان شاهد تعداد  بیشتر دختران در سن ازدواج نسبت به پسران هستیم. از دیگر نگناهای ازدواج در ایران می توان از ارزش هایی مانند مصرف گرایی- تجمل گرایی افزایش انتظارات و توقعات- بالا بودن جهیزیه و مهریه- كاهش ارزش تاهل به عنوان یك ارزش اجتماعی و خصوصا بیكاری و مشكلات مسكن و هزینه مراسم ازدواج نام برد.

             The Marriage Squeeze

    An imbalance in the numbers of males and females at prime marriage ages

produces a marriage squeeze effect. Marriage patterns should reflect preferences in mate

selection when the sex-age com//position// of the marriage market is in perfect

equilibrium, which means the same number of males and females at all ages. The

optimum scenario, however, is not always achieved. For instance, sex differences in

mortality or migration patterns can easily create disequilibria in local marriage markets

by decreasing or increasing the population of males or females of certain ages. History

provides some illustrative examples on how war related mortality dramatically reduced

the number of males. In a classical work, Louis Henry (1966) explored for France how

the heavy lost of males during the First World War affected the marriage behavior of

both male and female cohorts at marriageable ages. Despite the fact that women were

trapped in a severe marriage squeeze, the proportion never marrying hardly changed.

This paradox encouraged Henry to further explore the mechanisms by which the

squeezed cohorts were able to overcome the situation without modifying excessively the

proportions never marrying.

The marriage market equilibrium can also be altered by in- and out-migration

movements. Thus, transoceanic migrations have changed the marriage markets of origin

and destination societies: in Europe the marriage market was favorable to men, whose

numbers were reduced by migration, in America and Oceania, final destinations of these

migrants, women were scarce. The massive male immigration to certain localities in

Australia during the XIX century provides an interesting example of the scarcity of

potential brides, which had important effects on marriage levels. On the other hand, in

rural-urban migrations, women have tended to migrate to urban areas in greater

proportions than men, increasing the level of bachelorhood in rural areas.

Along with mortality and migration, variations over time in the number of live

births, depending on strength and length, can also affect, the age-sex structure of the

marriage market a couple of decades later, as larger or smaller cohorts enter the

marriage market. From a theoretical point of view, isolating the effects of differential

mortality and migration by sex, if males and females marry within the same age, the sex

ratio at birth would explain one hundred per cent of the sex structure of the marriage

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market. Given, though, that almost universally men marry younger women, an increase

in the number of births will lead to a scenario where the size of a male cohort will be

smaller than subsequent female births cohorts. On the contrary, when the number of

births decreases, male birth cohorts will be larger than subsequent female cohorts.

Beyond the causes that reside behind a marriage squeeze, disequilibria in the

marriage market can be grouped on the basis of which sex squeezed. Therefore, two

different types can be created: (1) excess of women - scarcity of men; (2) excess of men

-scarcity of women. To the best of our knowledge, little has been done to specifically

compare both types of marriage squeeze. Assuming exactly the same length and

strength, does the scarcity of men produce the same effects on the marriage patterns as

the scarcity of women? To answer this question, let’s first briefly explore what are the

main consequences of a marriage squeeze.

Marriage squeeze effects can be tested using theoretical models. As shown by

Shoen (1983), in a fictitious marriage market, changes in age-sex com//position// influence

marriage behavior by changing the level and distribution of marriages. An interesting

conclusion derived from Shoen’s work, but not later developed by the author, is that a

decrease in the number of births, which catches men in a marriage squeeze, has greater

effects than an increase of births, which produces the inverse situation. Thus, this idea

implies that there are somehow asymmetric effects on the marriage market depending

on the kind of marriage squeeze.

Despite conclusions arising from models, empirical analyses of the marriage

squeeze are less conclusive. A marriage squeeze does not alter the level (proportion of

ever-married) or the distribution (difference between male and female mean ages at

marriage) of marriages in the way that would be expected from a theoretical model.

Squeezes in the marriage market have been solved through different mechanisms. For

instance, it is commonly stated that the rapid demographic growth occurred in Sub-

Saharan countries has contributed to polygamy. But in those societies where polygamy

does not exist, marriage squeeze has to be solved in a different way. It is generally

observed that the level of marriages is rarely affected by a marriage squeeze, even in

severe situations. Henry (1966) demonstrated that a strong difference in age-sex

com//position//, produced by large losses of men during First World War, had a

surprisingly slight effect on the level of marriage. Societies, concludes Henry, adapt

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themselves easily to the sex-age disequilibria by modifying mainly the distribution of

marriages. Brides and grooms appear to adapt to, rather than to be constrained by, the

age distribution of partners available. The marriage market is flexible; age preferences

seem to be far from rigid. The conclusions reached by Bhrolchain (2000), in her study

of English and Welch females born between 1917 and 1922 caught in a marriage

squeeze, and Schoen (1983), in his studies on the US, point in the same direction. The

twentieth century US experiences indicate that the marriage squeeze had also little

effect in the level of marriage, that is the proportion of ever married, but a considerable

effect on its distribution. As some of the examples cited above suggest, the main

mechanism by which a specific population overcomes a marriage squeeze is by

changing the distribution of marriages. Age preferences flexibly accommodate

substantial changes in the number of partners available. Age preferences in the marriage

market are shaped by opportunity. Moreover, historical differences between male and

females mean age at marriage must not be seen as a sign of esthetic preferences, but as

the current balance of infinite age adjustments from the past (Cabré 1993). The almost

universal fact that men are older than their spouses seems to be the consequence of a

universal past too, based on excess female mortality caused by childbearing and for the

greater trend to remarry among widowers. This argument differs from that of Guttentag

and Secord (1983), who postulate that the observed mean age difference between

spouses is due to a balance of power.

In the case of Brazil, with increasing cohorts and decreasing mortality, younger

cohorts are larger than older cohorts, creating a constant ‘excess of women - scarcity of

men’ marriage squeeze type, which according to Green and Rao (1992) is considered to

be one of the causes behind the rise of consensual unions in that country.

Finally, the degree of change to be expected from a marriage squeeze depends

on its tightness and context where it takes place. Measuring the tightness of the

marriage squeeze has been a difficult task. No method offers a perfect solution that

takes into account all the complexities of the marriage market. The simplest measure is

the sex ratio that compares men at certain ages with female x ages younger, x being the

observed mean age difference between spouses. The main advantage of the sex ratio is

its easy and straightforward interpretation, which is always to provide an illustrative

picture of what is the strength of the imbalance. But comparing men to women x year

younger is not representative of the real distribution. In fact, a difference of 2-3 years is

not the dominant factor.

A more refined measure is to compute a ratio of men to women, but the total

number at each age is weighted by the probability of marriage (Akers 1969). By taking

into account probabilities for men and women separately the results change, because

somehow both probabilities are shaped by opportunity: the weighted sex ratio is

partially influenced by what it pretends to measure. Further developments have been

made to consider exclusively the single population or to break down the marriage

market in groups, based on sex, age, and educational characteristics. However, all these

measures, as Mc Donald points out (1995), suffer as well from the circularity problem.